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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MONROE CITY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
VS. 
CHARLES L. ARNOLD, NORRIS K. 
ARNOLD and JOHN R. ARNOLD 
d 1b I a Arnold Hog Ranch, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11,300 
Suit by third-class city to restrain and abate operation 
of commercial piggery on outskirts of town as a public 
nuisance. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
District Court found operation of piggery to be a public 
nuisance and ordered operation abated and restrained 
further operation by Defendant of a commercial piggery 
in the City of Monroe. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant - Appellant seeks an order vacating the 
judgment and order of the District Court and dismissing 
this action, or for a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action is filed by the Plaintiff in its capacity as a 
third-class municipal corporation of 850 people (R. 163) 
alleging that it has a right and duty to take such action 
for the benefit of its inhabitants. (R. 1) 
The pleadings named Charles L. Arnold, an individual, 
as the sole defendant. (R. 1) The answer filed by Charles 
L. Arnold denied that he had done the acts charged in 
the complaint (R. 5, fourth defense). The Defendant 
Charles L. Arnold was merely an employee of a partner-
ship operated by his sons, Norris K. Arnold and John R. 
Arnold, known as Arnold Hog Ranch (R. 8, 10, 13, 17, 19, 
21,53,54,55,56, 136). 
Over the objections of the Defendant, Charles L. 
Arnold and during the course of the trial the Court 
ordered Norris K. Arnold and John R. Arnold added as 
defendants in their partnership capacity as Arnold Hog 
Ranch without service of summons, amendment of 
pleadings, etc. (R. 56, 57). The Court relied on Rule 21, 
URCP and the fact that said persons had received notice 
of the proceedings and had employed counsel to defend 
Charles L. Arnold. (R. 63, 175, 176). 
The Court refused to receive evidence concerning siin-
ilar agricultural use being made generally by many other 
residents in Monroe City (R. 134, 135, 151, 152, 197), 
claiming that existance of one nuisance does not create 
a license to establish another nuisace. (R. 134, 135, 151, 
152, 197), and rejected argument that reasonableness of 
use should be measured by the use to which other persons 
similarly situated put their land (R. 138, 151, 152). 
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Defendant produced an aerial photograph of the City 
of Monroe (Exhibit "E") with colored slides (Ex. "F") 
keyed to the photograph which depicted 19 commercial 
livestock operations in Monroe and the probable source 
of much of the odor complained of by witnesses, which 
offer of proof was rejected by the Court (R. 151, 152, 
197). 
The hog ranch in question is situated one half block 
on the South of the last street on the South edge of Mon-
roe City. (Item #20 on the overlay attached to the aerial 
photograph marked exhibit "E") There are a few houses 
scattered along the North side of that street, but no 
houses South of the hog ranch. It is suggested that the 
aerial photograph, overlay and slides be used to explain 
the physical setting. 
The hog ranch is modern, with cement floors in most 
areas, sanitary farrowing sheds and facilities, automatic 
watering and feeding equipment, chemical controls are 
used to control flies and rodents, the pens are cleaned 
daily and only hay and dry commercial feed consisting 
primarily of grain, minerals, vitamins, antibiotics and 
supplements are fed. No garbage or waste is fed. The 
pens and sheds are kept clean and dry. The pigs are not 
permitted to accumulate or to wallow in mud or muck. 
(R. 49, 58-63, 139-143, 166). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MONROE CITY HAS NO POWER TO SUE TO ABATE 
OR ENJOIN A NUISANCE 
Several reasons exist why Monroe City cannot prose-
eute this action in the manner attempted in this lawsuit, 
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which disabilities render the judgment entered herein 
void. Some of those reasons are as follows: 
(a) Monroe City is not the real party in interest: 
Rule 17 (a) , URCP, reads in part as follows: 
"Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest; ... when a statute so provides, 
an action for the use or benefit of another shall be 
brought in the name o fthe State of Utah." (Empha-
sis added) 
Monroe City claims to have the right and duty to bring 
this action for the use and benefit of its citizens (R. 1, 
Par. 1), however this action is not brought in the name 
of the State of Utah as required by Rule 17 (a). Defend-
ant is entitled to have a cause of action prosecuted by the 
real party in interest so that the judgment will preclude 
any action on the same demand by another, and so that 
the defendant will be permitted to assert all defenses 
available against the real owner of the cause. Shaw v. 
Jeppson, 121 U. 155, 239 P.2d 745. 
This action is to abate and to enJom an alleged nui-
sance. The right. to maintain an action for nuisance is 
defined in 78-38-1, UCA, 1953, which reads as follows: 
"Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent, 
or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the 
free use of property, so as to interfere with the com-
fortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance 
and the subject of an action. Such action may be 
brought by any person whose property is injuriously 
affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by 
nuisance; and by the judgment the nuisance may be 
enjoined or abated, and damages may also be re-
covered." (Emphasis added) 
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The lawsuit is entirely for the benefit of the inhabitants 
of Monroe City (R. 1, Par. 1) and not for the benefit of 
Monroe City Corporation whose property is not claimed 
to have been "injuriously affected". The real party in 
interest and the only party who can bring this action is 
a property owner in Monroe City whose property is al-
legedly "injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoy-
ment is lessened by ... " the alleged nuisance, or by the 
city health department in the name of the State of Utah 
if the alleged nuisance is dangerous to health or life as 
provided in 26-5-5, UCA, 1953. 
(b) Powers granted to Monroe City can only be exer-
cised by adopting and enforcing ordinances. 
Monroe City as a Municipal Corporation possesses only 
those powers conferred upon it by express legislative 
enactment. Tooele City v. Elkington, 100 U. 485, 116 P.2d 
406; Stevenson v. Salt Lake City, 7 U. 2d 28, 317 P.2d 
597. Those powers can only be exercised by the enact-
ment and enforcement of municipal ordinances as pro-
vided by 10-5-6, and 10-7-2, UCA, 1953, which read in 
part as follows: 
"10-5-6. The ... city council in cities of the third 
class ... are and shall be the legislative and govern-
ing bodies of such cities and towns, and as such shall 
have, exercise and discharge all of the rights, powers 
and privileges and authority conferred by law upon 
their respective cities, towns or bodies, . .. " (Empha-
sis added) 
and 
"10-7-2. When by this title power is conferred upon 
the ... city council ... to do and perform any act 
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or thing and the manner of exercising the same is 
not specifically poiinted out, the ... city council ... 
may provide by ordinance the manner and details 
necessary for the full exercise of such powers." 
(Emphasis added) 
Plaintiff failed to sustain its burden of proof by failing 
to prove that it had exercised the powers which it claims 
were conferred upon it by 10-8-60 and 10-8-67 and which 
Plaintiff claims authorizes it to prosecute this action. 
Those statutes which confer powers upon cities read in 
part as follows: 
"10-8-60. They may declare what shall be a nuisance, 
and abate the same, and impose fines upon persons 
who create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist.'' 
(Emphasis added) 
"10-8-67. They may prohibit any offensive, unwhole-
some business or establishment in and within one 
mile of the limits of the corporation, compel the 
owner of any pigsty, privy, barn, corral, sewer or 
other place to cleanse, abate or remove the same, and 
may regulate the location thereof." (Emphasis 
added) 
The statutes quoted above require that as a condition 
precedent to Monroe City exercising the powers therein 
mentioned the city council must adopt ordinances which 
"declare" Defendant's hog farm to be a nuisance. The 
court cannot take judicial notice of city ordinances. State 
v. Butcher, 74 U. 275, 279 P. 497. Enactment of an ordi-
nance to take advantage of the delegated powers is a 
condition precedent to exercise of those powers. If no 
ordinance has been adopted or other appropriate action 
taken by the city council to implement the power con-
ferred by statute, Monroe City has no more power than 
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if those statutes had never been enacted. The right to 
exercise those powers cannot be delegated to the City 
Attorney. Art. VI, Sec. 29, Utah Constitution. 
The powers conferred upon Monroe City by 10-5-6 and 
10-7-2 UCA, 1953, quoted on page 5 are expressly 
limited by 10-8-84, UCA, 1953, to the enactment and en-
forcement by Monroe City of ordinances which carry 
those powers into effect, and does not confer upon Mon-
roe City the power to bring this lawsuit as claimed by 
Plaintiff. That statute reads in part as follows: 
''10-8-84. They (cities) may pass all ordinances and 
rules, and make all regulations, not repugnant to law, 
necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all 
powers and duties conferred by this chapter, and 
suoh as are necessary and proper to provide for the 
safety and preserve the health, ... improve ... the 
comfort and convenience of the city and of the in-
habitants thereof, and for the protection of property 
therein; and may enforce obedience to such ordi-
nance with such fines or penalties as they may deem 
proper; . . . " (Emphasis added) 
The above statute authorizes Monroe City to adopt "ordi-
nances," "rules," and "regulations" "necessary" to 
"carry into effect" "all powers" conferred by Chapter 8 
of Title 10, UCA, 1953. Both 10-8-60 and 10-8-67, UCA, 
1053, relied upon by Plaintiff to authorize this lawsuit 
are part of Chapter 8 and accordingly can only be exer-
cised by the adoption and enforcement of ordinances, 
rules and regulations as provided by 10-8-84, UCA, 1953, 
quoted above. A municipal corporation may exercise 
only the powers granted, and in the manner prescribed. 
Tooele City v. Elkington, 100 U. 485, 116 P.2d 406. Monroe 
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City has no power to ignore the legislative mandate and 
to elect to select another unauthorized method of en-
forcement of its power by bringing this action. 37 Am 
Jur. Mun. Corp. 731, Sec. 117. 
( c) Monroe City must bring action in manner pre-
scribed by statute. 
The legislature has delegated certain police powers of 
the state to municipal corporations, however crime pre-
vention, protections of health, etc. are functions of the 
state rather than of any subdivision thereof, and the 
officers appointed are public officers whose duties are 
defined by law, and they serve the people of the whole 
state rather than the municipality which appoints them. 
37 Am. Jur. 745, Sec. 131; 
The legislature has by 10-7-3, UCA, 1953, required all 
cities to establish by ordinance a board of health for their 
city, which has power granted by 26-5-1, UCA, 1953, to: 
" ... supervise all matters pertaining to the sanitary 
condition of its ... city, and shall have power and 
authority to order nuisances . . . to be abated or 
removed." 
and is required by 26-5-5, UCA, 1953, to abate nuisances 
in the manner prescribed by that statute which reads in 
part as follows: 
"26-5-5. ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE.-Each local 
board of health shall cause every nuisance danger-
ous to health or human life to be abated. When com-
plaint of such nuisance is made it shall forthwith 
cause the matter to be investigated and shall deter-
mine whether or not the alleged nuisance is detri-
mental to the public health or the cause of any 
disease or mortality. 
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Whenever a local board of health shall determine 
that a nuisance detrimental to health exists it shall 
in writing notify the occupant of the premises where 
the same may be found or, if unoccupied, the owner 
or agent thereof of such finding and shall order the 
abatement or removal of such nuisance within two 
days. If such nuisance is not abated or removed pur-
suant to such order, the board may summarily pro-
ceed to abate or remove the same, or it may cause an 
action to be brought in the name of the state by the 
county attorney for the abatement of such nuisance." 
(Emphasis added) 
The evidence in this case shows that Monroe failed to 
make a determination that Defendant was creating a 
health hazard, that it failed to give written notice to the 
owner or occupant of the premises, failed to order an 
abatement or removal of the alleged nuisance, (R. 57) 
all of which are conditions precedent to the right of the 
Monroe City Health Department to abate the alleged 
nuisance. Such an action also must be brought in the name 
of the State of Utah as required by that statute, and must 
be prosecuted by the County Attorney, not the City At-
torney. Regulation of health is a function of the State, 
not of a municipal corporation, and 26-5-5, UCA, 1953, 
quoted above, prohibits the City of Monroe from main-
taining any such action except through the properly 
designated Board of Health officials who are responsible 
to the state, not to the Municipal corporation. (See dis-
cussion on page 8 of this brief). The findings of the 
Court (R. 29, par. 7 & 8) purport to find that the al-
leged nuisance is detrimental to health, which if true 
establishes that the court lacks jurisdiction to grant a 
judgment in this matter since the power to sue to abate 
nuisances of that type has been reserved to the State of 
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Utah and has not been delegated to Monroe City, except 
to the extent that the Monroe City Board of Health (who 
are officers of the state) can bring an action in the name 
of the State of Utah. Where the statute prescribes a mode 
by which a particular act is to be done the prescribed 
mode must be followed if the act is to be valid. 37 Am 
Jur. Mun. Corp. 731, Sec. 117; Tooele City v. Elkington, 
116 P. 2d 406, 100 U. 485; Smith v. City of Bozeman, 398 
P. 2d 462, 144 Mont. 528; Stevenson v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 317 P. 2d 597, 7 U. 2d 28. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING PARTIES 
DURING THE TRIAL OVER OBJECTIONS AND 
WITHOUT AMENDING PLEADINGS, SERVING SUM-
MONS, PERMITTING ANSWER, ETC. 
While the first witness was testifying it became ap-
parent that Plaintiff had sued an employee of the Arnold 
Hog Ranch partnership but had not sued the partnership 
or any member thereof. The employee had delivered 
summons to a member of the partnership who had em-
ployed counsel to defend the employee in this action. 
Both partners were present in court as witnesses. The 
Court ordered the partnership added as a party and pro-
ceeded with the trial without service of summons, per-
mitting them to answer the complaint, to engage in dis-
covery proceedings or to otherwise prepare for trial 
defendant, allegedly under provisions of Rule 21, URCP. 
and over the objections of the defendant and the persons 
who were joined. (R. 8, 10, 13, 17, 19, 21, 53 - 56, 63, 175, 
176). The judgment shows however that the employee 
was dropped as an individual party defendant, that the 
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partnership was added and that the name of the employee 
was improperly named as a member of the partnership. 
The Court misconceived the intent of Rule 21 by at-
tempting to use it to substitute a new party defendant. 
Rule 21 is intended to afford relief to a plaintiff who sues 
too many or too few defendants, rather than one who sues 
the wrong party, and it contemplates the retention of one 
or more parties against whom the action can proceed 
and cannot be resorted to as a method of substituting one 
party for another. Barron & Holtzoff, Vol. 2, P. 218; 
The attention of the Court is invited to the designation 
of the Defendant in the findings and judgment (R. 28-31) 
and in the record on appeal as "CHARLES L. ARNOLD, 
NORRIS K. ARNOLD and JOHN R. ARNOLD d/b/a 
Arnold Hog Ranch." Charles L. Arnold has been dropped 
from the case as an individual and the judgment is 
against he and his sons in their joint capacity as alleged 
partners and binds their joint property of said alleged 
partnership only. The judgment as entered is not a judg-
ment against Charles L. Arnold individually except so 
far as he has a property interest in the Arnold Hog Ranch 
Partnership. Rule 17(d), URCP; Hammer v. Ballantyne, 
16 U. 436, 52 P. 770, 67 Am. St. Rep. 643; Blyth & Fargo 
Co. v. Swenson, 15 U. 345, 49 Pac. 1027; 39 Am Jur 
Parties 957-959. Rule 25 concerning substitution of parties 
is not applicable to our situation. The Court had no juris-
diction or power to proceed against the new defendant 
without the consent of that defendant and a stipulation 
by the existing, and without a complaint that requested 
relief against the new, defendant. 39 Am. Jur. Parties 
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958; Noonan v. Caledonia Gold Mining Co., 121 US 393 , 
39 Led 1061, 7 S Ct 911. Rule 4(c), URCP, provides in 
part as follows: 
"The court shall have jurisdiction from the time of 
filing the complaint or service of summons." 
The jurisdiction of the court has not been invoked 
against the new defendant since no summons has been 
served or complaint filed as required by Rule 4(c), 
URCP, which would give the court jurisdiction over that 
party. The court has no right to adjudicate property 
rights of persons who are not parties to the action and 
who are total strangers to the record. Houser v. Smith, 
19 U. 150, 56 P. 683. Rule 19 (b), URCP, requires the 
service of summons when even a non-indispensable per-
son ought to be joined in an action. Certainly the same 
rule should apply where the suit has been filed against 
the wrong party or where an indispensable party is to 
be joined. 
POINT III 
ABATEMENT OF HOG RANCH AND INJUNCTION 
AGAINST ITS OPERATION IS UNAUTHORIZED, UN-
ECESSARY AND EXCESSIVE IN THIS CASE. 
Injunctive relief is proper only to restrain inflicting of 
substantial, serious and irreparable damages to the party 
seeking injunctive relief and where there is no adequate 
remedy at law. Rule 65A(e) (2) and (3), URCP; Mc-
Gregor v. Silver King Min. Co., 14 U. 47, 45 P. 1091; 29 
Am. Jur. Injunctions 216, Sec. 23, et seq. 
(a) Monroe City is not authorized to sue for injunction 
In a proper case an actionable nuisance may be en 
joined in an action filed by a person " ... whose property 
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is injuriously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is 
lessened by nuisance; ... " 78-38-1, UCA, 1953. The 
powers granted to Monroe City by 10-8-60, UCA, 1953, 
to "declare what shall be a nuisance and abate the same" 
' and by 10-8-67, UCA, 1953, to " ... compel the owner of 
any pigsty ... to cleanse, abate or remove the same ... " 
can only be exercised by the enactment and enforcement 
of city ordinances as provided by 10-5-6, 10-7-2, 10-8-60 
and 10-8-84, UCA, 1953. See discussion on pages 4- 7. 
Monroe City simply has no power to maintain an action 
for an injunction to enjoin the operation of a hog ranch 
except in the name of the State of Utah to abate an con-
dition dangerous to human life. (See discussion on page 
No. 8-9) 
(b) The court erred in refusing to allow evidence con-
cerning other commercial livestock operations in Monroe 
City. 
Monroe City is a country town of approximately 850 
inhabitants, who are primarily engaged in agricultural 
activities, which has at least 20 commercial livestock 
operations located within its city limits. The Arnold Hog 
Ranch is located South of the populated section of Mon-
roe City and % block South of the last street on the South 
edge of town. Defendant offered into evidence an aerial 
photograph of Monroe City (Exhibit "E") with an over-
lay which shows the location of each of the 20 commer-
cial livestock operations, and various colored slide photo-
graphs (Exhibit "F") of each of those commercial live-
stock operations which depict the type of operation, in-
cluding the muck, mire, manure, debris, area, livestock, 
etc. existing in each operation a few days before the trial. 
The numbers in the right-bottom corner of the slides are 
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referred to in the transcript, however for ease of cor-
relation between the overlay and the slides, numbers on 
gummed labels have been added in the left-upper corner 
of each slide which correspond with the same number 
large for the area depicted on the overlay. 
The overlay, slides and testimony pertaining thereto 
were offered to illustrate and explain that Monroe City 
has a large number of other commercial livestock oper-
ations located within the city limits (which extend be-
yond the area depicted on the aerial photograph), to 
show the reasonableness of the use complained of in the 
Monroe City locality and the probable other sources of 
the alleged unpleasant odors attributed by Plaintiff's 
witnesses to the Arnold Hog Ranch. (R. 151, 153, 194-
196). The court rejected the slides (Exhibit "F") and the 
proffered testimony concerning the other commercial 
livestock operations in Monroe City on the theory that 
the alleged existence of one nuisance does not justify 
the establishment or continuance of another nuisance as 
stated by this Court in Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-
Products Co., where injunctive relief was denied. 104 U. 
221, 229, 137 P. 2d 347, 352. (R. 151, 197). We agree with 
the rule of law stated in the Ludlow case, however that 
rule cannot be applied until the court first applies the 
nuisance test of the reasonableness of the use complained 
of in the particular locality and in the manner and under 
the circumstances of the case stated by this court in the 
case of Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 71 U. 1, 11, 262 P. 
269. Cannon v. Neuberger, 1 U. (2d) 396, 298 P. 2d 425; 
Coon v. Utah Construction, 228 P. 2d 997. 
In the Ludlow case odors from the rendering plant 
were obnoxious to such a degree that it was impossible 
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to enjoy a meal when the wind was in a certain direc-
tion, and owners of nearby properties were awakened at 
nights and rendered sleepless by noxious smells, how-
ever in balancing the equities the court awarded dam-
ages for reduction in value of property and refused an 
injunction. 
Our case does not involve the obnoxious smell of cook-
ing carcasses of dead animals such as was involved in the 
Ludlow case, but simply the usual barnyard smell of 
pigs. The overlay (Exhibit "E"), slides and proffered 
testimony, all of which were rejected by the court, show 
that commercial hog operations are conducted by other 
inhabitants of Monroe City at the following numbered 
locations on the overlay: 
#1-450 So. Main-40 feeder hogs, 2 sows and couple 
of large feeder pigs, mucky condition. (R. 154, 155) 
#3-40 head hogs-slaughter operation with entrails 
of animals lying on premises. Very dirty and mucky. 
Likely source of much odor. (R. 194) 
#17-usually about 30 hogs (5 on date of trial) ad-
jacent to Arnold Hog Ranch. Very dirty and mucky con-
dition without cement floors or modern facilities. 
Probable source of strong odor. (R. 196) 
#18-50 hogs. Very mucky condition. (R. 196) 
In addition to the commercial hog operations a sub-
stantial number of Monroe City inhabitants maintain 
hog pens for domestic use, usually in confined quarters 
and in a mucky condition. Hogs, which are fed garbage, 
and milk cows, sheep and other domestic animals, which 
are generally in a mucky condition, all add to the odor. 
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It is extremely doubtful whether the smell of Monroe , 
City would be substantially lessened by discontinuing 
the Arnold Hog Farm operation. The reasonableness of 
the Arnold operation is to be measured by whether rea-
sonable persons generally, looking at the whole situation 
impartially and objectively, would consider it to be un-
reasonable. Hatch v. W. S. Hatch Co., 3 U. (2d) 295, 283 
P. 2d 217, 220. The city's power to declare, prevent or 
abate a nuisance does not include the power to declare 
anything a nuisance which is not one in fact or per se. 
Cox v. City of Pocatello, 291 P. 2d 282, 77 Idaho 225. 
Our case is ahnost identical to the Dahl v. Utah Oil 
Refining Co. case, 71 U. 1, 11, 262 P. 269 mentioned above 
where the grounds for complaint were that offensive and 
disagreeable fumes or odors eminated from the refinery 
which were carried through the air to plaintiff's house, 
which at times awakened persons sleeping in the house, 
required plaintiff to shut doors and windows, but were 
not constant, were not injurious to life or health, and 
caused no direct or physical injury to the property. The 
court in the Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Co. case supra 
reversed a judgment for the property owner, held that a 
case of actionable nuisance was not made out, and that 
the trial court had erred in not directing a verdict for 
the defendant and in denying defendant's motion for a 
new trial. About the only difference between our case 
and the Dahl case is that the odor is caused by pigs in an 
agricultural community while the odor in the Dahl case 
was caused by refinery fumes in a refining area. If all 
of the pigs in Monroe City and/ or all of the commercial 
livestock operations in Monroe City were to be removed 
because a few inhabitants of that agricultural community 
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object to barnyard and livestock smells the impact upon 
the economy of Monroe City would be serious. If Monroe 
City is permitted to single out the Arnold operation for 
abatement that action would constitute a denial of equal 
justice within the prohibition of the 14th amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Sec. 2 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. 37 Am. Jur. Mun. 
Corp. 782, Sec. 161. 
(c) An actionable nuisance must be proven by clear 
and convincing evidence. Wade v. Fuller, 12 U. (2d) 299, 
365 P: 2d 802. The findings (R. 28-30) fail to include a 
finding that plaintiff has carried its burden of proof by 
clear and convincing evidence as required. Accordingly 
the judgment herein is based on a mere preponderence of 
proof as cannot stand. 
(d) The judgment of abatement and injunction is ex-
cessive and should be reversed. 
The operation of a hog ranch in or near an agricultural 
community is not a nuisance per se. The legislature has 
by 26-6-7, UCA, 1953, denied the power to license a hog 
operation unless garbage or offal are fed, and has by 26-
6-5, UCA, 1953, made it lawful to maintain a hog ranch 
or piggery so long as it is more than 50 feet from an in-
habited house. Commercial feeds and haw are fed by 
Arnolds and the nearest residence is approximately 400 
feet from the nearest pen. (R. 158) If the court in a 
proper case were to conclude that the Arnold operation 
is in fact a nuisance it should attempt to work out a 
method to abate the nuisance without enjoining the 
operation. 
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Defendant's operation used modem sanitary methods 
and equipment, cement floors in most of the pens, slatted 
floors for ease of washing and cleaning in areas where 
young pigs are born and kept and chemicals to control 
and kill flies and rodents. No garbage or offal is fed in 
the Arnold operation. Hay and commercially prepared 
dry feed is used with automatic feeders which keep the 
feed dry and clean. Pens and corrals are cleaned daily. 
(R. 46-49, 58-63, 139-143) Under the circumstances the 
Arnold operation should not be enjoined as a nuisance 
unless all piggeries from their very nature are found to 
be nuisances. Kalamazoo Twp. v. Lee, 228 Mich. 117, 199 
NW 609, 2 ALR3d 947; Francisco v. Furry, 82 Neb 754, 
118 NW 1102, 2 ALR3d 947; Vana v. Grain Belt Supply 
Co., 143 Neb 125, 10 NW2d 474, 2 ALR3d 948; see also 
cases annotated at 2 ALR3d 947-949. 
Defendant indicated that it was about to invest in ad-
ditional equipment and facilities which would improve 
sanitary conditions and reduce odor at the time that this 
action was commenced, but refrained from investing ad-
ditional funds pending the outcome of this lawsuit. (R. 
166, 167) 
If an actionable nuisance is found to exist at the Arnold 
Hog Ranch the court should have limited its order to 
"cleanse" the pig operation as provided by 10-8-67, UCA, 
1953, (quoted on page 13) by installation of cement 
floor on the entire corral, requiring more frequent or 
daily removal of accumulated manure, painting of pens, 
buildings and other areas to facilitate cleaning, and 
should have attempted other means of reducing the odor 
problem without ordering a complete abatement of the 
operation. The Court can retain jurisdiction to assure 
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that the problem is in fact reduced and can take ap-
propriate action if the problem continues. Ludlow v. 
Colo. Animal By-Products Co., 104 U. 221, 137 P. 2d 347, 
headnote 9. 
SUMMARY 
Under Utah Law a municipal corporation has the 
power to enact ordinances declaring what is a public 
nuisance (within limits of definition of a nuisance con-
tained in state statutes), and to cause public nuisances 
to be abated and their continuance punished by fines and 
penalties. If the nuisance is detrimental the board of 
health of a municipal corporation, (who, like municipal 
police officers, exercise the police power of the state and 
are primarily responsible to the state rather than the 
municipality) may in writing order the abatement of the 
nuisance. If their order is not complied with they may 
summarily abate the nuisance or may bring an action 
for abatement and injunction in the name of the State 
of Utah, which action must be prosecuted by the county 
attorney. Any action to abate or enjoin a nuisance which 
is not detrimental to health must be brought by the 
owner of the property claimed to be injuriously affected 
by the nuisance. Monroe City is not a proper party plain-
tiff in this action since it is not authorized by any statute 
to maintain this action. Defendants are entitled to be 
sued by the real party in interest to avoid a multiplicity 
of actions. 
Monroe City failed to allege or to sustain its burden of 
proof that it had adopted municipal ordinances to imple-
ment the powers granted to it by the legislature. If no 
ordinance has been adopted by Monroe City to implement 
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those powers it can no more exercise those powers than 
if they had not been delegated by the legislature. 
The lawsuit was improperly filed against an employee 
of the Arnold Hog Ranch partnership who filed an an-
swer denying the allegations in the complaint. During 
the trial it was established that the wrong party had been 
sued. Over the objections of the defendant and new party 
the court permitted a substitution of parties by dropping 
the individual defendant and adding the two partners 
who were present in court. No summons was served and 
the complaint was not amended. The court awarded 
judgment against the partnership abating and enjoining 
the Arnold Hog Ranch operations although no pleading 
was ever filed which asserted a claim for relief against 
that partnership. The court claimed to be entitled to do 
so under Rule 21, however that rule gives relief to a 
plaintiff who sues too many or too few parties, not one 
who sues the wrong party. The judgment against the 
Arnold Hog Ranch partnership is beyond the jurisdiction 
of the court and is void. 
The court refused to admit testimony, colored slide 
photographs or other evidence proffered to establish that 
some 19 other commercial livestock operations were 
being conducted within the corporate limits of Monroe 
City, that several commercial pig operations were being 
operated under unsanitary conditions in the same area 
of the city and that many domestic animals including 
pigs were maintained by inhabitants of Monroe City, 
claiming that the existence of one nuisance does not 
justify the establishment or continuance of another 
nuisance. The proffered evidence is material and rele-
vant as to the probable source of much of the odor com-
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plained about, and to determine whether the Arnold Hog 
Ranch operation is reasonable under the circumstances 
and in that locality, and to thus determine if it is in fact 
a nuisance. This error by the court seriously affected de-
fendant's rights and defendant should be granted a new 
trial where that evidence is admitted. 
The court failed to make a finding that the evidence 
established a nuisance by "clear and convincing evi-
dence" as required by law, accordingly the findings are 
insufficient to support the judgment and it should be 
reversed. 
The judgment abating and enjoining the operation of 
the Arnold Hog Ranch constitutes a taking of their prop-
erty for public use without compensation, is excessive 
and unnecessary. Defendants are willing to cement the 
floors of the few corrals that are not now cemented, to 
facilitate cleaning, to invest in equipment for daily re-
moval of accumulated manure from the premises, and to 
do other appropriate things to reduce odor and improve 
sanitation. The court should make an order designed to 
improve the operation and reduce the odor or other of-
fensive conditions: The court can retain jurisdiction and 
take appropriate further remedial action if a problem 
continues to exist. An injunction should be used only 
after other remedies have failed. 
Defendant is entitled to equal rights with the other 
inhabitants of Monroe City. Appropriate ordinance 
should be adopted in the manner provided by law and 
should be applied equally toward the Defendant and all 
other inhabitants. This lawsuit attempts to single out 
this defendant for special treatment and denies it equal 
justice guaranteed by the Utah and U. S. Constitutions. 
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It is doubtful that abatement of the Arnold Hog Farm 
operation would substantially change the odor of Monroe 
City. Abatement of all commercial livestock operations 
in the city would seriously affect the local economy. Res-
idents of an agricultural community should expect a 
reasonable amount of livestock and barnyard odor. 
Rights of the parties should be carefully considered and 
weighed. 
It is respectfully requested that the judgment entered 
by the court be reversed and that the case be dismissed 
or remanded for a new trial with appropriate parties, 
pleadings and evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorney for Defendant-
Appellant 
